This chapter surveys the philosophical problems raised by the two Darwinian claims of the existence of Tree of Life and the explanatory power of natural selection. It explores the specificity of explanations by natural selection, emphasizing the high context dependency of any process of selection. Some consequences are drawn about the difficulty of those explanations to fit a nomological model of explanation, and the irreducibility of their historic-narrative dimension. The paper introduces debates about units of selection, stating the compelling force of genic selectionism but highlighting some critiques. It then addresses the limitations of selectionist explanations: the compared status of selection, drift, and phylogenetic inertia are investigated, and the debates over adaptationism are presented, with the aim of defining the varieties of adaptationisms as research programs. In order to assess the scope of natural selection, the chapter addresses weak and strong challenges to the Synthetic theory of evolution both from paleontology (punctuated equilibria, Gould's contingency thesis) and the evolutionary theory of development. We finally sketch some consequences of evolutionary theory concerning philosophical questions about human nature, on the basis of the hypothesis of the universality of selectionist explanations: this part deals mostly with epistemology and psychology.
Introduction
The theory of evolution, from Darwin to the Modern Synthesis formulation, provided a framework of explanative strategies to explain diversity and adaptation in the living realm. Considered on a large scale, Darwinian science advanced and justified two main claims: the Tree of Life, meaning that all the extant living species are always historical results of common descent, and the Selection hypothesis, meaning that one of the most important mechanisms to account for those transformations is ''natural selection.'' Hence, it added to the ancient life sciences a new explanandum, e.g., phylogenesis, and a new explanans 1 -natural selection-which is also an explanatory resource for more traditional kinds of problems.
Of course, the consequences of the two main Darwinian claims were not recognized immediately; people were too much concerned by the two metaphysical issues of evolution versus creationism, and of the animal origins of man. It took a little less than a century to acquire the historical distance that enables one to rightly appreciate the novelty of Darwinism and this happened with the Modern Synthesis. For the Synthesis, population genetics has a central status within evolutionary thinking: historically, two of the founders of the synthesis, Fisher and Wright, were population geneticists, and some fundamental statements of evolutionary biology are enunciated in population genetics (Fisher's theorem, Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium, etc.); conceptually, the definition of evolution, as a change of the gene frequencies in the gene pool, lies in the field of population genetics. This essential feature of the theory was not conceivable in the time of the first Darwinians, since the gradualist view of transformism seemed to contradict the discontinuous vision of organisms as mosaics of traits that Mendelian genetics had presupposed. It is often and truly said that neoDarwinism unified Darwin and Mendel, thereby superseding such an apparent conflict.
2 Weissmann, by separating soma and germen and advocating that there was no transmission of the acquired characters, gave a clear meaning to the difference between Darwinism and Lamarckism and allowed his followers to regard only what is in the germen as the substrate of evolution, enabling the future integration of genetics within evolutionary biology. Moreover, Weissmann proved impossible the theories of heredity and variation maintained by many biologists and Darwin himself, according to which hereditary traits could be produced within the individual organism's cells and flow continuously from them. It then became possible for geneticists to propose mechanisms of heredity and variation in which the Darwinian theory of natural selection had only to assess the facts of heredity and variation, without being in principle committed to any theory of heredity (even if that was what Darwin actually did).
In order to grasp the new kind of epistemological problems brought by the two Darwinian contentions, it is quite useful to recall the features of the earlier biology that they replaced. The main explanans of diversity and adaptation before Darwin was, as we know, the divine design, although other hypotheses were being proposed more and more often, especially the evolutionary theory of Lamarck, which was adopted by Geoffroy Saint Hilaire and many morphologists at the beginning of the nineteenth century. This design was invoked to account for some prima facie teleological features of the living world, such as the fine adaptation of organisms to their environment, or the fine tuning of the mechanisms of biological function, or, in the end, the proportions of individuals in various species and the geographical relationships between species. The divine design yielded simultaneously the individual designs of organisms, unlikely to be produced by the mere laws of physics, and the design of the whole nature that Linnaeus called the ''economy of nature.'' The Selection hypothesis gave a powerful explanation of those two designs, since adaptations of organisms as well as distributions of species in a population were likely to be understood by appealing to the process of natural selection (even if other mechanisms like Lamarckian ones were also used by the first Darwinians 3 ). Since the result of such a process is a Tree of Life, biologists justify the striking similarity of forms between different species of the same genus, or even different genera of the same family-this fact being an immediate result of the common descent of different members of a same taxon.
However, the rise of Darwinism did not mean a total shift of the relevant questions and tools in biology. Rather than deleting centuries of research in the science of life, Darwinism gave a new and coherent meaning to some admitted facts and descriptions. Instead of rejecting teleology outside science, it provided a way of interpreting teleological phenomena so that they did not depend on nonnaturalistic presuppositions, such as hidden intentions of the organisms or their creator; it kept the result of the traditional taxonomist's effort and conceived the systematic proximities in the classification of species as historical affiliations, as Darwin himself noticed at the end of the Origin of Species (even if, of course, the Darwinian views raised new questions and permitted new criteria and methods for systematists (Ghiselin 1980) ).
So, evolutionary theory appears to us as the most successful and integrative framework for research strategies in biology. Before investigating the details of the epistemological challenges raised by the two Darwinian claims, it is therefore useful to situate evolutionary theory within the whole of biology. Here, Ernst Mayr's conception of explanation in life sciences will be of some help. In effect, Mayr distinguished two kinds of causes as different answers to the question ''why'' (Mayr 1961) . When asked: ''why does this bird fly along the seashore to the south?,'' you can answer by pointing out its physiology, respiratory system, the diverse pressures on its wings, and the streams of air around it: this indicates the proximate causes of the bird's flight. But you can also answer by emphasizing that the way it takes to go to the south curiously corresponds to the old demarcation of the continents, and you will understand that this is a result of natural selection acting on this species of bird to improve its time of migration. This is the ultimate cause of the bird's trajectory. Notice that the first causes concern exclusively one bird, and each bird is concerned by them in the same way, meaning that they are generic causes. On the contrary, the ultimate causes collectively concern the ancestors of this bird and not the bird itself.
Notice also, and this will be of importance for all epistemological considerations, that the two kinds of causes do not answer exactly the same question: the former answers the question ''why does the bird fly along the seashore (rather than being unable to fly)?'', whereas the latter answers ''why does the bird fly along the seashore (rather than somewhere else)?'' This distinction, highlighted in another context by Sober (1986) , means that the two kinds of causes are embedded in different explanatory strategies. As Mayr would remark, a complete biological explanation of a phenomenon makes use of all those strategies. And the two kinds of causes correspond to two kinds of biological discipline: on the one hand, as sciences of the proximate causes we have molecular biology, physiology, endocrinology, etc. while on the other hand, as sciences of the ultimate causes we have all those disciplines belonging to evolutionary biology: population genetics, ecology, paleontology, etc.
Having characterized evolutionary theory as a specific set of research programs within biology, and those programs being defined by the use of the hypothesis of natural selection, we can present some evolutionary problems raised by evolutionary theory. These will concern essentially the nature and the limits of the explanation by natural selection. Thus, I will reveal these two kinds of problems by picking out, in each category, one or two fundamental and currently debated issues. Then I will stress some important consequences of evolutionary biology upon philosophical theorizing about human nature.
We must nevertheless notice that all those issues involve both biological and philosophical considerations. They will sometimes be closer to theoretical biology and the methodology of biology than to philosophy but will sometimes include apparently pure matters of metaphysics that make no difference in empirical science. However, I claim that there is a set of problems raised by evolutionary theory that is of essential interest for philosophy, but that cannot be handled by the traditional means of a general philosophy of science-and that therefore must constantly appeal to considerations of theoretical biology. The fact that the Modern Synthesis has a unique character compared to other improvements in science (Shapere 1980) , is surely one of the reasons for this peculiar status of the philosophical problems raised by evolutionary theory. However, given this special status, authors contributing to the debates are either philosophers of science, like Hull, Sober, Rosenberg, or Kitcher, or sometimes biologists who may have made major contributions to evolutionary biology, like Mayr, Gould, Maynard-Smith, Williams, or Lewontin. Philosophy of biology partly emerged from the dissatisfaction of philosophers of science with the logical positivistic program and their will to find new paths toward unsolved questions, and partly from the need, felt by biologists, of conceptual elucidations of the bases of their practice and of the consequences of their theories.
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Evolutionary biology: its challenges for philosophy of science 2.1 What is selectionist explanation?
2.1.1 The process of selection and the property of fitness Natural selection is a process that is expected to take place whenever the following requirements are fulfilled: there is a set of individuals; those individuals reproduce; there is variation among them and those variations are likely to be hereditarily transmitted; due to interaction with the environment, some varying properties provide their bearer with a chance to leave more offspring than individuals who lack such a property. No matter what the entities are that fulfill those requirements, their set is, from now on, susceptible to be affected by natural selection. For this reason, people have proposed a theory of natural selection of macromolecules to account for the origins of life (Eigen 1983; Maynard-Smith and Szathmary 1995) , or theories of natural selection of ideal elements in order to explain cultural evolution (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981; Boyd and Richerson 1985; Campbell 1990 ). The methodological problem here is to invoke a process of heredity, which is not as obvious as in the case of genes.
And, reciprocally, when one meets a set of individuals fulfilling these requirements, one can assume that those individuals have undergone natural selection so that their properties are the effects of natural selection (or, more precisely, the fact that they have the properties that they have, and not some other properties, is the effect of selection).
Evolutionary theory in philosophical focus
Let us state some characteristics of explanation by natural selection. First, this belongs to what Mayr (1959b) called ''population thinking,'' e.g., the explanandum has to be or to belong to a class of entities-what we call a populationfor otherwise the differential reproductive success that is the result of having or not having a property, which in turn is what is meant by the word ''selected,'' would not be determinable.
This explanation by selection might be contrasted with what Sober (1984) called ''developmental explanation,'' namely, an explanation of the property of an individual appealing to the process through which it was acquired. 4 The developmental explanation of the composition of a football team is the sum of the experiences of each of its players; the selective explanation is the choice of the team by the manager, who set a criterion of competence and then evaluated all available football players by this criterion. What is peculiar to selectionist explanation is the fact that there are no determined criteria of admission other than reproductive success.
This brings us to an essential characteristic of selectionist explanation, namely the fact that it is always selection for effects; hence it is blind to causes. No matter whether a red deer reaches reproductive success over his congeners as a result of his higher race speed, or through his visual abilities to detect predators: in both cases, the fact that he leaves more offspring will mean that his genes (among them, the ones bound to the decisive property) will be more greatly represented in the following generation. This sole fact is basic to natural selection and to selectionist explanations. According to a distinction made by Sober (1984) , selection of something X (for example the red deer) is always selection for some property A enhancing survival and reproductive success (but of course, other properties, linked with A in X, are also selected of).
If we measure the selective advantage conferred on an individual by its properties, and use the term ''fitness'' for such a measure, then different properties (different in physical and chemical terms) will be likely to have the same fitness (always measured in a given environment). Thus, two consequences follow concerning fitness. First, fitness is what philosophers of science call ''supervenient'' on the physical and chemical properties of traits. This means that, if two traits are different, they may have the same fitness or not, but if two traits have different fitnesses, they must be physically or chemically different. Supervenience, so defined, implies ''multirealisability,'' meaning that a same fitness can be realized by various ontologically different properties and devices (Rosenberg 1978; Brandon 1990; Sober 1993) .
The second consequence is that this property of fitness, since it depends on population-thinking explanatory strategies, has to be thought of as a probabilistic one, hence as a ''propension'' (Mills and Beatty 1979; Brandon 1990 5 ). This has an obvious reason: fitness is indicated by differential reproductive success, hence by the number of offspring. But two different individuals can have the same fitness and nonetheless leave different numbers of offspring. Mills and Beatty used the example of the twins, sharing a same genotype in a same environment, hence having the same fitness; nevertheless, one of them is struck by the lightning while still a young man, whereas the other mates and has six children. Thus, the actual number of offspring cannot represent the fitness; but fitness has to be measured by the expected number of offspring, which is a probabilistic parameter. A given individual may not leave the number of offspring stated in its ''fitness.'' One can easily see here that, if this were the case, then the fittest individual would be the one who leaves the most offspring, and evolution as the ''survival of the fittest'' or the reproductive success of the fittest would be a tautology. So, the idea of fitness defined according to a propensionist theory allows us to avoid the charge of tautology recurrently raised against Darwinism.
If fitness is a supervenient property, this entails important consequences for the relationship between biology and the physical sciences. In short, no necessary physical statement can account for biological phenomena involving selectiontherefore, fitness-since the same fitness could be realized by other physical matters of facts, laws, and properties. Hence, evolutionary theory supervenes on the physical propositions and theories. But what about the status of selectionist explanations in biology when compared to the explanations in physical sciences?
Laws and selectionist explanation
Here we come across the rather entangled philosophical topic of scientific laws. Physicists state laws of nature. However interpreted, those laws of nature are general statements formulated in the modality of necessity. 6 The usual puzzle in philosophy of science is to find a criterion distinguishing accidental generalities and laws (Ayer 1956) . As an answer, Dretske (1977) claimed that laws have to be conceived as relationships between universals. But in any case, laws should support counterfactuals: this means that if some variables are changed within them, the results should be affected in a regular way. This implies that lawlike generalizations can be used in explanations, whereas accidental generalizations seem not to allow such a use and even less a predictive use. 7 The positivistic account of science viewed explanation as a deductive argument whose conclusion is the explanans, and whose premise sets some laws of nature with some particular statements of facts [the so-called DN account of science: Hempel (1965) ].
In a provocative chapter of his Philosophy of Scientific Realism, Smart claimed that there are no biological laws, since any law has to be reliable for any individual, e.g., has to be stated in the form ''for any X, P(X).'' But in evolutionary theory, we only have statements concerning limited sets of entities, like teleost fishes, or more generally, birds in America, or Equus. People can forge seemingly law-like general assertions on the basis of such generalizations, like Dollo's law concerning irreversibility in evolution, or Cope's law concerning the increasing of size in populations; but they are nevertheless still spatio-temporally situated general statements lacking any nomothetic necessity. Necessity is supposed to hold for any individual of a given kind with no specification of space and time. These regularities fail to explain but merely describe; they are not predictive since they always find exceptions. 8 For Smart, such biological regularities are like the schemata of engineers and are in the same way embedded in laws of physics. Even the universality of genetic code is a generalization on our planet, due to the contingent reason of common ascendance (contingent regarding the code itself), since the same correspondence laws between nucleotides and amino acids are not to be expected on any planet. For Beatty (1997) , this contingency of generalized propositions affects the whole of the supposed law-like statements in biology. So the DN account fails to represent evolutionary theory.
The only evolutionary statement that could be a law is, thus, the one enunciating the process of natural selection since it specifies no particular entity. Philosophers debate about the nomothetic status of this principle of natural selection (PNS) (Bock and Von Wahlert 1963; Sober 1984 Sober , 1997 Brandon 1996 Brandon , 1997 Rosenberg 1985 Rosenberg , 1994 Rosenberg , 2001 ). Rosenberg argues that the PNS is the only law of biology and relies on Williams' (1970) axiomatization of the theory, which conceives fitness as an undefined primitive term, e.g., a term which in some definitions, in some contexts, can be given only outside evolutionary theory, in 7 Taking a famous example from Goodman, what predictions could I infer from ''all the men in this room are third sons'' (unless I have some additive information on those men, like: ''they are all attending a third sons' meeting'', etc.)? 8 Rosenberg (1994) also denies that biology has laws in the sense of physical laws since it supervenes on all the physical laws and hence can only pick out disjunctions of laws applied in limited contexts.
another theory. But, even if by convention we say that it is a law, we still face the question of its differences from the other kinds of law. 9 In effect, unlike physical laws, the PNS does not state any natural kind of property such as mass, electric charge, etc. The only property involved in its formulation is fitness, which is a mere supervenient property.
So the PNS becomes the equivalent of a physical law-stated in probabilistic language, of course-only as soon as some physical characters of the properties contributing to fitness are specified, a specification which is always context dependent.
10 For instance, the ''optimal shift towards viviparity'' described by Williams (1966) in some marine fishes results from a kind of law, since he stated the parameters ruling the selection pressures (density of predators, physiological cost of reproduction); parameters which in turn determine a range of relevant physical properties for selection. Hence, in this case the schema becomes predictive, and we can test it by building experiments in which the values of the variables concerned vary. This idea, however, does not exhaust all biological regularities, principally the aforementioned ones found in paleontology. Thus, recalling the two claims of evolutionary theory concerning both the Pattern and the Process of evolution, this way of constructing law-like sentences through the PNS is mainly relevant to the Process of evolution, whereas the Pattern is most likely to show nonexplanatory regularities.
So, if evolutionary theory is not, as Smart contended, a nomothetic science, neither is it a class of empirical generalizations combined with some mathematical tools. Moreover, in addition to the PNS, there is surely a set of genuine laws in evolutionary theory, since its core, population genetics, provides some models, such as the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium, which prescribes a nomological necessity to any pool of genes in an infinite population. However, those kinds of propositions are not so much empirical laws as mathematical laws. They define a sort of mathematics of genes. Such models are in no case a description of any actual population, for in order to be applied to populations they have to integrate empirical content, i.e., by fixing the fitness coefficients of alleles. But this is not the same thing as fixing the parameters (mass, charge, etc.) in any standard physical case, because fitness can only be locally defined, its relevant parameters being determined by the environment considered.
11 And, even worse, those parameters are likely to change without change of environment since many cases of selection are frequency dependent. Admittedly, over three decades, after Maynard-Smith (1982) , we have developed a powerful mathematical tool to build models in cases in which selection is frequency dependent, e.g., the value of a trait in an individual depends on what other individuals are and do: this is evolutionary game theory, which can provide models in which ordinary population genetics fails because it treats fitness as a property of individuals and hence cannot forge models when fitness depends on frequency. The status of those models, however, is the same as that of the classical models of population genetics. Maynard-Smith (1982) insisted on the fact that one has to investigate the strategy set before applying any game theoretical model to empirical cases, which means that by itself, game theoretical theorems and proofs, no matter how illuminating, do not have empirical content. So, in a way, evolution contains both statements stronger than physical laws (since they are purely mathematical models) and statements nomothetically weaker such as those derived from the PNS by its empirical instantiation. Rather than a law, the PNS in the end proves to be an explanatory schema, providing ways of explaining and building models through its more or less empirical instantiations. The least empirically instantiated are models of population genetics; at the most empirically instantiated level, we have law-like generalizations, such as paleontological ones. In a way, it is a matter of convention whether or not to call them ''laws'': the point is just to determine their epistemological nature.
Historical narratives and selective mechanisms
As Bock and Von Wahlert (1963) wrote, one must distinguish the processes of evolution, which involve-but are not to be equated with-natural selection, and the outcome of evolution, namely phylogenies and the Tree of Life. However, no actual process of evolution could be understood solely through knowledge of mechanisms and without historical data. Let us give an example. Many terrestrial vertebrates are tetrapods. One could imagine a selective hypothesis concerning the adaptive origins of their four limbs since they are obviously adaptive for locomotion. However, there is another reason for those four limbs: marine ancestors of those vertebrates had four fins, so the four limbs are a legacy, resulting from what we can call ''phylogenetic inertia.
12 '' The point is that natural selection often explains the appearance of such traits but not in this precise clade, so the selectionist explanation has to be historically situated in order to determine what the correct explanandum is, for which natural selection would be the right explanans. Thus, no understanding of the presence of characters in the organisms of a given population or species is available through the sole application of models of natural selection. The specific character of evolutionary theory, if we consider that its explanatory strategies are always related to some use of the selectionist explanation, is that it brings together some formal models, written in mathematical language and in the modality of pure necessity, and some historical narratives, which allow scientists to instantiate the modes of natural selection in actual cases. 13 Paleontology as well as the population genetics of given groups, species or clades, is essentially committed to a double-faceted scientific conceptuality, both historical and nomothetical.
The methodological aspect of this status is that no empirical inquiry in evolution can be made without comparative data, or some incorrect ahistorical use of natural selection mechanisms, such as the one exemplified previously, is always possible. And often the divergence of results between inquiries has to be traced back to differences between the sets of comparative data used by the researchers Orzack 1994, 2001; Griffiths and Sterelny 1999 pp 240-250) .
This pervasive character of historical narratives in neo-Darwinism accounts for the historical meaning of all biological terms throughout evolutionary theory. Taxonomies are obviously and easily reinterpreted by history, and the concept of homology that helps systematicians to build their classification immediately acquires the historical status of ''common descent's sign'' like bird's wings and bat's wings. Homoplasy, as the other kind of similarity across species, seems at first glance less historical: similar selective pressures gave rise to similar devices, as adaptations to such contexts. But is the concept of adaptation lacking any historical dimension?
The question of whether adaptation is a historical concept is widely debated. Even if it is admitted that ''adaptation ascription are causal-historical statements'' (Brandon 1996) , since to say that a trait is an adaptation is to say that it has been somehow selected for some of the advantages it gave to its bearer via differential 12 On phylogenetic inertia, see Orzack (1994, 2001 ), Reeve and Sherman (2001) , and below 2.2.2. 13 A case for historical narratives in evolutionary theory is made in Richards (1992) ; compare with the critique by Hull in the same volume. Gayon (1993) addressed the dual character of evolutionary theory.
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reproduction, it remains to be decided whether this provides the whole meaning of the concept-given that, in fact, biologists often do not appeal to historical inquiries in order to describe adaptations but just forge optimality models with current data. Sherman (1993, 2001 ) advanced a powerful ''current concept'' of adaptation, opposed to the historical concept sustained by the majority of philosophers of biology in accordance with Brandon (Sober 1984; Ruse 1986; Griffiths 1996) . They propose that: ''an adaptation is a phenotypic variant that results in the highest fitness among a specified set of variants in a given environment'' (1993 p 9). Having distinguished two goals of evolutionary research, the first being the explanation of maintenance of traits and composition of population, and the other the reconstitution of history of lineages, they argue that the former essentially needs the current concept, while the latter is much more related to the historical concept. Notwithstanding one's conclusion, the fact that there is a historical component of adaptation ascriptions is important, since it allows biologists to distinguish between the origin of a trait as an adaptation and its current presence and maintenance.
14 A trait that is adaptive might not have emerged as an adaptation or might have emerged as an adaptation for some other use: this is grasped by the concept of ''exaptation'' suggested by Gould and Vrba (1982) , an example of this being the insect wings that probably emerged as thermoregulatory devices (Kingsolver and Koehl 1989) . Exaptation has proved to be a useful concept for understanding a lot of features that appeared during the evolution of hominids (Tattersall 1998 ).
However, one should not conflate two meanings of the historical characterization of adaptation: there is a definitional meaning and an explanatory meaning. On the one hand, selection defines adaptation, since a trait being an adaptation means that it originated through natural selection. But on the other hand, we say that selection explains adaptation: is not this contradictory to this definitional meaning? Not at all, because by this we now mean that the explanation of a given adaptation may search for concrete selective pressures in the given environment, and this provides an agenda for experimental testing of hypotheses. An example of such experiments, and then of the explanatory use of the historical concept of adaptation, is the study by Antonovics of the differential sensibility of plants to gradients of metal in soils (Antonovics and Turner 1971) .
A formal characterization of selectionist explanation and the issue of units of selection
The precise characterization of adaptation has been the focus of a large controversy in biology, and the philosophy of biology, about what exactly is likely to be adapted. Wynne-Edwards (1962) claimed that groups and populations were sometimes adapted. This meant that natural selection worked in favor of groups or populations, which sounds contradictory to the fact that individuals are the entities subsisting and spreading through selection. Williams (1966) gave a forceful defense of selection and hence adaptation as bearing exclusively on individuals. And, since the determinants of hereditary variations that are selected are genes, he concluded that selection acts primarily at the level of the genes. It is to be remarked, however, that he did not refute the logical possibility of adapted groups and then group selection, but proved that the alleged cases of group selection were explainable by natural selection at the level of genes, which is somehow more theoretically parsimonious. 15 Along those lines, Dawkins (1976 Dawkins ( , 1982 elaborated his view of genic selectionism (or the ''gene's eye view'' of evolution), trying to account for all manifestations of selection. 16 One must here distinguish genic selectionism, which is an assertion about processes of selection and selectionist explanation, from genic determinism, which means that all phenotypic traits are wholly caused by genes with no impinging of environment or learning. One could perfectly subscribe to genic selectionism without genic determinism, as did Dawkins himself, and Dennett (1995) or Rosenberg (1985) . Some practitioners or propagandists of sociobiology did make this confusion, which bore some hazardous moral and political consequences that in turn proved quite damaging for serious research conducted in those fields. But the genic selectionist's concept of gene only requires that the presence of a gene in a genotype in an environment makes a difference relative to the lack of this gene in the same context; the weaker requisite is that genes be ''difference makers'' (Sterelny and Kitcher 1988) , and here there is no commitment to any assumption about what genes determine and through which channels. This idea is the meaning of the locution ''gene for'' which unhappily has been read in a deterministic sense. Genic selectionism does not prevent an environment from being as much a determinant as genes in the success of a trait (Gray 2001) .
One of Dawkins' major arguments was the concept of inclusive fitness developed by Hamilton through his research on kin selection. Here, turning to the level of genes within selective explanation appeared fruitful in studying such features as cooperation or altruism that sounded at first glance contradictory to natural selection as enhancing the individual's fitness. The question, then, was to determine a level at which natural selection could explain the fact of altruism such as sterility of males in some hymenoptera species. Altruism has been selected because, although it decreases the fitness of the altruistic individual, it increases the representation of its genes in the next generation, provided that the individual is closely enough related genetically to individuals benefiting from this altruism. This is the case in insect societies that are essentially kin societies.
Genic selectionism has been challenged in several ways by Gould, Lewontin, Sober, and Brandon. One main argument is that selection acts only on phenotypes hence is blind to genotypes. Therefore, the level of genes is not relevant for understanding selection. Many genotypes, hence many genes, are identical selectively provided that they are ''genes for'' the same phenotypic trait. Using a notion elaborated by Reichenbach and Salmon in a philosophical debate about probabilities, the argument states that phenotypic interactions screen off the efficiency of genotypes and their relationships with environment. It does not deny that together with environments genotypes cause the phenotypes, but rather that this kind of causation does not explain the outcome of selection since it is necessary and sufficient for this purpose to consider the effects of the interaction of phenotype with its biotic and abiotic environments.
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The other line of defense, stated by Lewontin and Sober (1981) , is the context-sensitivity principle, which claims that, since the phenotypic effects of a gene depend on the environmental and genetical context of its expression, a single allele cannot be the bearer of the selective causal process. The authors' example is then the case of heterozygote superiority, since in this case the diploid genotype (e.g., AA, or Aa or aa) and not the single allele (e.g., A or a), is the genuine entity supporting the selection process. One can surely mathematically describe what happens to the single allele, but this gene's eye view account is not causally explanatory.
Although biological evolution has been theoretically defined as a change in gene frequencies, the fact that the general model of the process of selection is not committed to any determination of the entities undergoing natural selection implies that they are not necessarily ''genes.'' Hull gave a formulation in terms of replicators (hereditarily reproducing entities) and interactors (entities whose causal relationships affected the hereditary success of the replicators they are associated with). 18 In most classical cases of natural selection, replicators are genes and interactors organisms. The gene's eye view, then, says that since genes are the replicators, they are the units of selection. But of course this formal definition could be applied to other cases, in which replicators could be species or clades, or interactors could be genes themselves or groups. A more fine-grained approach of the various processes of selection is, thus, allowed by this formal characterization. For example, in the case of meiotic drive or segregation distorters-cases important to Dawkins' argument-genes are themselves the interactors. But the ''replication'' idea faces some specific problems since it mixes the idea of reproducing, and the idea of copying (Godfrey-Smith 2000a). Only genes replicate since organisms reproduce but they do not copy themselves; yet, unlike organisms, genes are not alone in the replication process, they are involved in a whole machinery (ribosomes, enzymes, proteins, etc.). However, this machinery allows the differential expression of genes in the genome through regulation of their transcription into mRNA and proteins. This transcription might be thought of as a copying of the gene, but it is not really a reproduction, since it is a process distinct from the replication of the cell in mitosis or inheritance through meiosis. Moreover, this copying process is submitted to the regulation of gene expression, contrary to the replication in mitosis. The general conclusion is that in no case are ''copy'' and ''reproduce'' synonymic or correlative notions, which weakens the very notion of ''replication.'' One point of interest of such a formulation is nevertheless that it can handle selection even outside biology, for instance, when we talk about cultural entities. 19 The theoretical problem that faces this vision is to define a form of heredity in order to pick out the replicators. Hull thought that his formal characterization of selection was quite a logical one and embraced all possible cases. Giving the counterfactual example of the ''protein world'' that has no replication of entities, Godfrey-Smith (2000a) showed that the interactor-replicator couple is not necessary to the selection process as such; however, in our world, almost any selective process does rely on these elements.
Easily expressible in this context, another argument against genic selectionism rests on the ''parity thesis'' (Sterelny, Griffiths) , stating that all elements of the replication process are on a par (Griffiths and Gray 1994; Griffiths and Knight 1998; Oyama 2000) , since environments as well as cytoplasmic elements or learned traits are ''difference-makers'' in the phenotypic outcome, exactly like genes. 20 This thesis challenges both genic selectionism and genic determinism. Moreover, proponents of this theoretical alternative sometimes called Developmental System Theory contend that there exist kinds of heredity other than genetic inheritance, for example, nest styles, bird songs, or methylation patterns (Gray 2001; Jablonka 2001; Neumann-Held 2001) . This challenge to gene's eye view, consisting in a multiplication of the replicators, is more radical than the other critiques because the whole concept of the selective process has to be transformed. 21 However, while accepting several kinds of replicators, MaynardSmith and Szathmary (1995) trace a line between ''limited'' and ''unlimited'' inheritance, the latter allowing a quite infinite range of creation and transmission of elements. Only genes-and language-provide such an inheritance, which accounts for the extreme diversity and creativity of biological and cultural evolution.
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The thesis of genic selectionism has been undoubtedly stimulating in compelling people to clarify their concepts and presuppositions. In fact, reacting to Dawkins' extreme positions, some biologists did conceive of cases and mechanisms of group selection that could escape Williams' critique. Nunney (1999) tried to define lineage selection, an idea that was suggested by Hull (1980) , whereas Gould invoked a species selection (for properties, such as size, sex, etc.) that Williams (1992) refuted, although admitting and defending a clade selection above the level of genic selection. 23 D. S. Wilson and Sober provided theoretical grounds for the use of group selection (Sober 1988a; Wilson 1992; Wilson 1994, 1998) , and, especially in Unto others, designed a pathway from evolutionary altruism to psychological altruism. Their argument first relies on distinguishing and comparing within-group and between-group selection processes. Wilson and Sober's argument invokes a ''common fate'' (Sober 1988a ) of individuals in a group selection process, which implies that the selection process is compelled to act on all those individuals as a whole; then, secondary selective processes maintain this common fate, and selection can act at the level of the group. One consequence is that even kin selection appears as a form of group selection, rather than being genic selection's underpinning of an apparently altruistic phenomenon. Group selection, however, is not exclusive of genic selectionism, since its point is that groups are vehicles; it is yet another question to decide whether or not genes are the only replicators involved.
Concerning genic selectionism, two strong positions are opposed nowadays among philosophers of biology. The first one, formulated by Brandon (1988) is pluralism: it states that there are several levels of selection and several units of selection. It is then an empirical question to know in any given case which are the actual forms of natural selection, but most empirical evidence is in favor of selection above the level of organisms in some cases, added to selection at the level of genes. The opposing position is defended by Sterelny and Kitcher (1988) , who claim that there is always a genic selectionism which operates together with any kind of selection, even if we cannot have empirical access to this level, and even if it is pragmatically more interesting for biologists to recognize supraorganismic selection processes and treat them as such. The genic level is always the ''maximally informative'' one. 24 Those philosophical considerations do not, in fact, impinge on biological investigations. It seems that biologists are in practice mostly pluralist on this issue (for example, Williams 1992), but it is not clear whether the decision between the two contrasting positions could be settled by the results of empirical inquiry. Some biologists, in fact, ignore those considerations and take for granted, since it is required by their practice, that there are several levels of selection (Keller and Reeve 1999 ) that have to be studied for themselves. But the recognition of the plurality of levels-notwithstanding the question of its ultimate theoretical reducibility to a genic one-gave rise to the important biological issue of their articulation. Michod (1999) elaborated the schema of a Darwinian dynamics, which accounts for the progressive emergence of new kinds of units of fitness: macromolecules, genes, cells, organisms, etc. The process relies widely on tradeoffs between decrease in fitness in lower levels (for example, association of individuals creating a common interest, which hurts the interest of the individual) and increase in fitness at the higher level (for example, the level of the association itself), and this trade-off is exemplarily a case of multilevel selection. The recurrent problem is then to find models that show how, in each case, the prime for defection (e.g., breaking the association), which is available each time there is a ''common good'' (Leigh 1999) , can be overcome through this multilevel selection.
Although developed at a rather conceptual level, and mostly by philosophers, such controversies bear important consequences for the general meaning of the theory of evolution. What is at stake with altruism is the possibility of extending selectionist explanations in order to understand phenomena in the human domain. If altruism is explainable either by kin selection theory, or by Trivers' reciprocal altruism (1971), which holds for populations of nonrelated organisms and is now derived from Game theory, particularly from the results of the study of the Prisoners Dilemma by Axelrod, then the issue of levels and units of selection is at the same time the issue of the foundation of an evolutionary approach, not only of the emergence of man and human societies but also of the current human psyche and societies through a selectionist framework, a research program now called ''evolutionary psychology'' (see below 3.2). Of course, altruism as studied by biologists is not what vernacular language calls altruism. For example, some very ''egoistic'' fellow (in ordinary language) would be biologically altruistic if he also wanted to leave no offspring; in contrast, a mother who sacrificed an entire life to her children, even if the perfect model of ''altruism'', would from a biological point of view be typically selfish since she is entirely devoted to entities, which share 50% of her genes. 25 So, no matter what the conclusion of the units of selection debate, all the lessons that might be taken from evolutionary biology into psychology have to be checked regarding whether they use vernacular or technical concepts and whether they do or do not carry illegitimate confusions between those two meanings.
Limits of selectionist explanation 2.2.1 The debate on adaptationism
Even if selectionist explanation is capable of rendering intelligible many nonbiological facts, no matter how far this capacity will be proved to extend, there 25 Sober (1988a). remains the preliminary question of its limits within the field of evolutionary biology. Darwin said that the Tree of Life (first principle of Darwinism) was partly explained by natural selection (second principle), but that there were other mechanisms at work in its production. 26 So, I now turn to the actual limits of selectionist explanation in explaining both the form of the Tree of Life and the peculiar features of organisms.
The question of the limits and conditions of selectionist explanation has been approached in what has been called the controversy about adaptationism. In a very influential paper, Gould and Lewontin described and criticized a too pervasive method in evolutionary biology, which they called ''adaptationist program.'' In short, adaptationism means to think that the majority of the most important features of the living realm are explainable by natural selection (Sober 1994a ).
There have been many attempts to clarify this adaptationism (Sober 1994a; Amundson 2001 ; Godfrey-Smith 2001b; Lewens forthcoming) 25 years of spandrels. In the cited title, this program, in summary, consists of atomizing an organism into discrete traits, and then building a selective history which establishes how each trait appeared as an adaptation to solve a peculiar problem. The authors contend both that we cannot atomize an organism in any way we want and that each trait allows the reconstruction of a selective history which should be testable. Too often, biologists, be they ecologists, paleontologists, or ethologists, create ''just so stories,'' e.g., stories that invent a plausible scenario of the resolution of a supposed antique problem-the trouble being that there is no way to prove that such a problem existed.
I have no interest here in deciding the fate of adaptationism. In fact, the most salient consequence of the spandrels paper is the necessity of clarifying the implicit assumptions in the research on adaptations, leading to a real formulation of an adaptationist program, and forcing scientists to take sides on the question.
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But, if the consequence of the controversy concerns the extension of the theory of natural selection to human psychology and sociology, this was addressed 26 ''I am convinced that natural selection has been the main but not exclusive means of modification.'' (1859 p 6). First of all, sexual selection, that is here left aside. For its complex relationship with natural selection see Mayr (1965a) and then the current research on the evolution of sex (Williams 1975; Maynard-Smith 1978) . 27 Maynard-Smith (1984) , Dennett (1995) profess adaptationism with some reservations; in contrast see Gould (1980 ), Wake (1991 . Orzack and Sober (2001) contain illuminating essays on the testability and the meaning of the adaptationist program. Lauder and Rose (1996) turned to an investigation of the meaning of adaptation in various fields of evolutionary biology. Dupré (1987) provides illuminating essays with a focus on the adaptationist commitments in evolutionary anthropology. Walsh (forthcoming) tries to make sense of the fate of the spandrels paper 25 years after its publication.
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primarily through the questions of its limits within biology. And here the major concept pointed out by Gould and Lewontin is ''constraint.'' By this word, people mean various things and state of affairs, so some clarifications are needed.
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Constraints can be physical, such as the size of the genome, which entails some impossibilities for rapid metabolism within a cell in salamanders (Wake 1991); or, more obviously, an elephant cannot have thin feet. They can be of genetical order, for instance, when two genes are too close to be separated by crossing over during meiosis. They can be phylogenetic, meaning that selection acts on entities that come from a determinate history and have then inherited features difficult to change. For example, selection cannot adapt a respiratory system of vertebrates by creating a perfect respiratory device but has to modify the preexisting devices in fishes. A constraint is recognized by comparison across several species or clades: the fact that giraffes, like all mammals, have seven neck vertebrae like mice, indicates that the number of such vertebrae is a constraint, since we would expect number of vertebrae to be more proportioned to size (therefore more adapted). Moreover, phenotypes undergo genetic constraints, since there are epistasies and pleiotropies which entail that a trait will, in any case, be accompanied by another trait which has no adaptive relationship to it. Or constraints can be ''developmental''-this word needs some further comment. Those meanings, unfortunately, are not easy to distinguish in fact. But let us keep in mind that this issue of the limits to the power of natural selection (of a given trait) facing constraints is tightly bound to the other issue raised by Gould and Lewontin, namely the impossibility of atomizing living beings into discrete traits. The set of constraints in the end gives the conditions for a kind of form untouched by selection but always slightly altered and reshaped by it, which after the German morphologists Gould and Lewontin named Bauplan.
However, the emphasis on constraint should be best understood with reference to the recent evolutionary theory of development.
29 Selection acts on variants, but not all variants are able to develop from a given gene pool. The evolutionary theory of development unveils the constraints on the rise of those variants upon which selection is about to act. For example, Wake (1991 pp 547-549) showed that in all species of plethodontidae, the feet have got four toes instead of five in the ancestor from which they derived by miniaturization. This happened in unrelated lineages, as an alternative state of developmental mechanisms sharply distinguished with the five-toes producing state. Adaptive processes select for size, and developmental constraints switch from five to four toes, independently of the lineage.
This example has nonetheless been challenged by Reeve and Sherman (1993) in one of the most convincing defenses of the adaptationist program. Their argument is rather simple: one can always appeal to selection even in Wake's case, since it is possible that there is a selection at an embryonic stage that eliminates variants that have more than four toes. So, the case for developmental constraints is not so easy to defend in the face of elaborated and differentiated concepts of natural selection.
Wimsatt elaborated the helpful concept of generative entrenchment, 30 meaning that, no matter whether or not selection acts on some feature, the fact that it has been built into the developmental program of a species at a rather early stage implies that it is easier, less costly, and more probable for selection to modify traits that appear later in development. Since to modify a very entrenched trait entails modification of numerous connected traits that are built on it, this modification is very likely to be nonadaptive, hence disregarded by selection. The more relative to the early formation of the organizational plan of a species a trait is, the more entrenched it is, so the less probable it is that selection will act upon it and modify it, hence it can be considered as a constraint for selection.
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Clarification of this debate has been provided by Amundson (1994 Amundson ( , 2001 , by arguing that in the end, developmentalists and selectionists do not ask the same question. Selection is appealed to in order to explain why such and such variants arose and spread in the gene pool among a given set of variants; but developmentalists, on the other hand, try to answer the question of the nature of this set of variants: why are there these variants and no other variants, and to what extent is the emergence of some variants unlikely or impossible? This, in fact, is not exactly a constraint on selection because selection is an explanans to a different explanandum than the one developmentalists are interested in.
This recognition of pluralism within the various explanatory strategies in evolutionary biology is likely to eliminate the false problems created by the adaptationist debates and leaves philosophers and biologists with the task of formulating and evaluating what could count as an adaptationist research program. Following Godfrey-Smith (2001b) and Lewens (in press), it is useful to define two large categories of adaptationists, the empirical one, who makes assertions on the pattern of the Tree of Life and the actual mechanisms of evolution, and the methodological variety of adaptationism, who contends that 30 Wimsatt and Schank (1988) . 31 Reservations are made about the generality of entrenchment by Raff (1996) ; a general critique of the concept is to be found in Sterelny (2000 p 377) .
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biologists have to suppose, first, the presence of adaptations, even if they recognize later that in fact the predefined adaptational optima are not reached and that constraints exist.
However, notwithstanding conclusions about the compared values of the many adaptationist programs or hypotheses, there is a larger fundamental issue to be addressed as a background to this question, namely the conditions under which we are likely to recognize the effects of selection and its place in relation to the other causes of evolution. I will first address the question of phylogenetic inertia related to selectionist explanation, and then I will turn to the question of the status of genetic drift.
Selection, drift, and phylogenetic inertia
Any model of real phenomena has to state a null hypothesis, namely, the description of a state in which there is nothing to explain, compared to which the actual state will have to be explained. Many radical changes in scientific thought, be they called ''revolutions'' in the Kuhnian sense, or more modestly ''shifts,'' consist in new definitions of the null hypothesis. For instance, Galilean physics began by conceiving of the rectilinear uniform motion as the ''null hypothesis'' (instead of rest), pointing out acceleration or trajectory changes as the right explanandum. And such a definition of the null hypothesis has been called ''the principle of inertia.'' So, the words themselves suggest that phylogenetic inertia is the null hypothesis in evolutionary theory. In any population, traits have to be explained if they are not obviously the result of descent, e.g., if they are not homologous of traits in the ancestor species. Of course, the determination of the traits as homologous or not depends on the set of species that are to be compared. Thus, the preliminary definition of this set of compared species in order to account for traits in a given species is an absolute condition for applying the PNS. Wrongly determining homologous traits by inadequate specification of the initial set of related species to which the explanandum species has to be compared immediately entails false results (Sober and Orzack 2001) . The ''just so stories'' stigmatized by Gould and Lewontin as unfalsifiable and abusive applications of the PNS often stem in the absence of data from such misunderstanding of the right null hypothesis.
However, methodologically, for a set of species, the relationship of homology and homoplasy implied by the statement of a null hypothesis is epistemologically related to the more fundamental principle of parsimony.
32 It can easily be seen that 32 See this volume Chapter 15 by Folinsbee K, Evans C, Frobish J, Tsuji L, Brooks D and alii. For a general philosophical account see Sober (1981 Sober ( , 1988b . the more we judge there to be homologies, the less evolutionary lineages we have to draw on: this is a kind of parsimony, so Hennig's auxiliary hypothesis can be called upon if one subscribes to epistemological parsimony. But the stronger, ontological claim of parsimony also supposes this way of defining the null hypothesis. Phylogenetic inertia, however, is not incompatible with selection. We have to distinguish between the question of the origin of traits and their presence. When the traits exist by phylogenetic inheritance but decrease in fitness in the new environment and the new species, selection is likely to suppress them or render them vestigial. In the reptilian family, this was probably so in the case of the four legs when it came to the snakes. So origin and presence are two distinct topics. If the inherited traits are still present, one is allowed to postulate no negative selection, but a positive fitness value may promote stabilizing selection to keep them. So selection and inertia are not two competing hypotheses but are sometimes distinct explanans for distinct explananda, and sometimes complementary explanatory resources. In this regard, the idea of a null hypothesis in the question of the maintenance of traits has even been challenged (Reeve and Sherman 2001) .
As early as the 1930s, Wright forcefully emphasized the evolutionary role of random processes (Wright 1932 ) such as genetic drift. The smaller a population is, the more powerful those kinds of processes are. This is a rather simple idea, since the same phenomenon is illustrated by the toss of a coin: a small sample is more likely to show a random bias (for example, seven heads versus three tails), than a large sample, which will show a half/half distribution of tails/heads, according to the law of large numbers in probability theory. So, in small populations, some genes, whose fitness is either equal or lower than other alleles, can go to fixation.
However, the concept of drift is not only a negative one, if it is connected with Wright's other concept, the adaptive landscapes. The fact is that in a gene pool some combinations are local optima, and if a genotype is on the slope of this kind of local optimum, selection will lead it toward this peak. 33 But there may be a fitness valley which separates it from another, higher, fitness peak so that its fitness will have to decrease in order to get it onto the other fitness peak. For this reason, only random drift, provided that population is small, can lead it through decreasing its fitness across the fitness valley toward another hill so that selection can, after that, lead it toward the global fitness peak. Then, through migration, the new genotype can spread. In this model, drift helps to increase fitness by moving genotypes to global fitness peaks. Drift is, then, together with natural selection, the other process accounting for the evolution of species, modeled by the travel of genotypes across fitness valleys and hill climbing. Wright named this schema the ''shifting balance theory,'' and empirical evidence for its generality is sometimes given but is not generally persuasive.
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Of course, this goes against Fisher's formulation that average fitness is always increasing; but the conditions of the two assumptions are not the same, since Fisher's theorem speaks about large, theoretically infinite, populations. Hence, evaluating the conflict between Wright's view of the role of random drift and Fisher's claim of an overall selectionist view, according to which the fittest always invades the gene pool, entails a decision on whether large or small effective populations are mostly to be found in nature.
But random drift raises some epistemological questions (and a more metaphysical one that I will address in the next section). The issue is stating the difference between drift and selection: are they two competing hypotheses? A first model, explored in detail in Sober (1984) , takes drift and selection as two kinds of forces acting on an equilibrium model formulated by the Hardy-Weinberg law (together with the forces of mutation and migration, which I do not consider here). If equilibrium is changed, then selection is acting; when the fitter allele is not fixed, then random drift must have perturbed selection. Outcomes are the result of the addition of selection and drift in an analogous manner to summation of forces in Newtonian mechanics. However, this model has been challenged in two papers by Walsh, Ariew, Lewens, and Matthen (2003, 2002) . They argue that selection and drift are not equivalent forces since they are not as comparable as two directional forces in dynamics. They do not compete at the same level, because ''natural selection'' is not exactly a force like the sum of selection pressures, but a sampling effect, supervenient on the real selective forces (fight, predators, mate choice, foraging, reproduction. . .) in the same way that entropy supervenes on microphysical states of molecules. On the other hand, drift is another kind of sampling, in the manner of a sampling error (compared to the fitness coefficients). Since summation of forces presupposes that their effects are additive, therefore, are acting at the same level, one cannot logically treat the state of a gene pool as the composed effect of selection and drift; and, finally, to talk of forces proves in general to be misleading, even for selection.
The question is not an empirical one but concerns the logical types of those population-level theoretical entities or processes that are selection and drift. Epistemologically, this means that there may be such a gap between drift and selection that the model of composition of forces has to be replaced by a 34 Coyne et al. (1997) . thermodynamical model of macroscopic effects of the statistical accumulation of heterogeneous microphenomena. The analogy of selection is no longer gravity but entropy, and we know that entropy as a variable bears no causal effect. Whether or not Walsh, Ariew, Lewens and Matthen's challenge is right, the point is that considering drift leads to no obvious model of selectionist explanation, since when one is about to derive empirical content from mathematical models of population genetics and the PNS, one has no sure principles for conferring an epistemological status to the process of selection. This does not affect our study of phylogenies or our making and evaluating models for its mechanisms, but the interpretations of those models, hence of the very nature of the mechanisms, are certainly at stake. If drift and selection are not to be compared as two different forces like electromagnetism and gravity in physics, Darwin's statement about the composed nature of the processes of evolution, and the subsequent agenda of weighting the components, has to be qualified.
The scope of natural selection
Evolutionary theory puts together the Tree of Life claim, and the Selection principle; however, these two statements are not logically connected. We can imagine a possible world where there is selection and not one Tree of Life; Lamarckism gives a picture of the opposite possible world. The question then is the relationship between the two claims: to what extent is the Tree of Life accountable for by natural selection? This question was present but quite attenuated in Darwin since he thought of other mechanisms than selection (e.g., Lamarckian inheritance). However, it becomes urgent in the Modern Synthesis because it focuses on selectionist explanation in the forms and conditions outlined previously.
All the puzzles investigated in the preceding section concern the selectionist explanation in general, whether it is applied to speciation in a population and on a short time scale, or to what Mayr called ''emergence of evolutionary novelties'' (1959a) (such as the transition of the protostomes to deuterostomes). However, there is a difference between those two objects, and this raises another question about the scope of the selectionist explanations under consideration up to now. For instance, it is plausible that Wright's SBT accounts for a lot of speciations on small time-space scales but that evaluating its validity on a wider scale may appeal to other criteria. Paleontologists distinguished after Goldschmidt (1940) microand macroevolution and wondered whether the same processes should be held responsible for the events in those two cases. Simpson (1944) argued that, even if macroevolution shows very different rhythms in different lineages, however, it Evolutionary theory in philosophical focus implies the same processes as microevolution. The main objection, from a paleontological perspective, namely the lacuna in the fossil records on a large timescale, could be explained by purely geological reasons with no need to postulate special processes to account for them. But Simpson felt compelled to isolate a ''mega evolution''-e.g., emergence of new lineages-that cannot so easily be interpreted along the lines of microevolution. Of course, Eldredge and Gould were the most convincing proponents of the difference between macro and microevolution, with the paleontological theory of punctuated equilibria. This theory is, first of all, a reading of the fossil records which claims that discontinuity is not a result of geological lacunae (as Darwin tried to establish in the Chapter IX of the Origin) when they show no major transformation for a very long period of time followed by sudden change. Here, the process accounting for this record is interpreted as a dual one, composed of fine tuning adaptation, which is a kind of stasis, and then a quick general transformation of the body plan giving rise to a new phylum. If the first process is explainable by selectionist explanations, such as the one I have considered up to this point, the second stage needs at least a change in the conditions under which natural selection can operate-if we still assume that no other process is needed.
No doubt challenges to Darwinian gradualism were numerous before Eldredge and Gould: before the Synthesis there were saltationists like De Vries and afterward came the ''hopeful monsters'' proposed by the geneticist Goldschmidt (1940) . As a result of this, Mayr (1965b) established that gradualism-meaning that no evolutionary change is due to a big mutation-is compatible with evolutionary novelties since any change (like exaptations of insect wings) or intensification (as in the evolution of eyes in some lineages) of function can account for many structural novelties. Punctuated equilibria is a really challenging theory because the difference in the form of the Tree of Life cries out for a difference in the nature or the conditions of processes. If we subscribe to the idea of Baupläne as an integrated set of constraints, as advanced by Gould and Lewontin (1978) , then we might think that phases of stasis represent fine adaptive tuning of the existing Baupläne, whereas quick transformations represent the appearance of new Baupläne.
Nevertheless, this view rests on some orthodox considerations of selection: among the founders of the synthesis, Mayr (1965b) emphasized the stabilizing role of selection, which, given a particular environment, largely eliminates big mutations since, given the high degree of integration of most organisms they are probably deleterious and often likely to threaten functional integrity. Periods of stagnation are, therefore, to be expected, by the nature of selection. The crucial point, however, is the logical relation between large-scale and smallscale evolution. Founders of the synthesis, like Fisher and Wright, focused on microevolution. However, some assumptions defining such evolution become false when we jump to macroevolution: environments are no longer stable, and they can change quickly and intensively; and phenotypic variation available is not stable either since a very different range of variation will be available if the time scale is larger.
This second parameter is connected to Gould's other main concern, namely evolutionary theories of development, and the focus on heterochronies crucial to his Ontogeny and phylogeny. The question is: what are the constraints on the range of variation, and what constraints are about to change? Developmental constraints are likely to account for the restriction of available variation and then for the focusing of selection process upon fine adaptive tuning and finally for the puzzling outcome of stagnation in the evolutionary tree. If we want to understand the transformation phase, we have to turn to the modification of available variation and then to a possible change in constraints. To this extent, if a modification happens in developmental mechanisms, then we could expect an enlargement of phenotypic variation, a new field for selection and thus new evolutionary possibilities. This is because, if we consider that the features yielding this enlargement are deeply entrenched, we can understand that in this case selection will act upon many connected traits at many levels of the developmental process, and so a radical change of existing body plan is likely to result. This was Gould's (1977 ) point, following De Beer (1958 concerning heterochronies: a change in the timing of development, involving many subsequent and connected transformations in the life cycle is more likely to transform the body plan of a species than is change in an adult trait. This sets the agenda for other kinds of evolutionary research, including not only the taxonomy of different mechanisms able to affect development and thus yield evolutionary novelties, 35 but also an attempt of causal accounting for them (an agenda which is a part of the Evo-Devo program). The important discovery of Hox genes developed in Lewin's studies on bithorax gene (1978; see Gehring (1998) for a historical account), which are homologous in arthropods and chordates, supports this thesis, since a slight replacement of such a developmental gene by the Antennapedia gene can give rise to a leg instead of an antenna in Drosophila.
36 Setting aside the complexity of the cascades of interactions, the general idea is that great transformations of a Bauplan may be generated by slight modifications of some kinds of genes or of 35 Like in Gould (1977) : heterochrony, paedomorphosis, neoteny are defined and exemplified. 36 Even if genes of this sort, such as Bithorax have been known since about 1915, a major stage in the emergence of Evo-Devo has been the molecular characterization of those genes in the 1980s, mostly by Gehring (see Gehring 1998 ). This revealed that homeobox genes are homologous across several phyla.
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their expression channels (Arthur 1997) because the development and life cycles are affected at many levels. Whether this view will prove correct or will need a radical revision, such as DST claims, and no matter the range of biological cases to which they apply, its epistemological significance requires integrating developmental biology and evolutionary biology in order to assess the multiplicity of the processes needed to account for the varied features of the evolutionary tree.
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On large time scales, environments are very likely to change, not only due to the evolution of organisms and populations, but also because of general geological and meteorological shifts. This second dimension of mega evolution converges with the first one to present the philosopher (a) with an epistemological issue. It also inspired Gould in his stronger challenge to overall selectionism (b).
a. The epistemological issue is the following: when variation range and environment change, populations exhibit a response to selection constituted along parameters that were not previously relevant. It could be said, then, that populations and organisms are evolvable. But some features make them more evolvable than others. Hence, at this large evolutionary scale the question may no longer be the evolution of adaptations (with all the epistemological problems addressed previously concerning nature and limits of selectionist explanation) but rather the evolution of evolvability itself. Changing explananda, then, could shift interest toward other levels of selection than genes and individuals, for example, clades and populations, since some population-level traits, such as sex or polymorphism makes them obviously more evolvable (Gould, Williams, Sterelny) . But it can also raise new questions, such as the evolutionary origins of those features of traits that make them easily evolvable: how, for instance, are we to explain the cohesion of genes in a chromosome (Keller 1999) , modularity (Wagner 1995; Sterelny 2004) or redundancy? So shifting the scale in the Tree also shifts interest from epistemological and methodological issues proper to selection, drift and inertia, to a general concern with new objects, such as modularity. b. In Wonderful Life, Gould tried to trace the philosophical conclusions of the recent analysis of the Burgess shale, particularly by Withington and Conway Morris. His verdict was that many phyla appeared with the Cambrian, of which only few survived; thereafter, very few new body plans and phyla were really ''invented'' through evolution. But this creativity in evolutionary novelty is somewhat puzzling and raises a concern for the new explananda stressed previously. With the famous metaphor of the film of life rerun, Gould suggested that the history of life was much too full of contingent events, such as the mass extinction that killed more than half of the Burgess phyla (plausibly after the fall of an asteroid, according to the Alvarez hypothesis). The punctuated equilibria claim was a weak challenge to an overall view 37 Gilbert et al. (1996) .
of selectionism since it can be reinterpreted as the necessity of defining two regimes of selection, the second one including the aforementioned concepts and concerns stemming from developmental theory. This latter view presents a strong challenge, since selection, and the adaptive capacities of individuals and species, cannot prepare them to face mass extinctions due to excessively strong changes of environment. Hence, the ones that survived did not owe their survival to their higher fitness, and the explanatory and predictive power of natural selection is very limited at this level of the history of life. Anomalocaris, for instance, seemed quite well fitted to its marine environment and was undoubtedly a strongly performing predator, surely no less well adapted than Pikaia, which seems to belong to the chordate phylum; it nevertheless disappeared. Thus, major events are contingent with regard to the parameters ordinarily involved in natural selection. This ''contingency thesis'' heavily restrains the scope of natural selection.
The fate of this challenge rests on a lot of empirical elements that are not yet available. In particular, the diagnosis of the Burgess fauna is still debated since Conway-Morris himself revised his original judgment (1998) and estimated that many Burgess phyla are in fact ancestors of already known lineages.
38 However, as Gould pointed out in his reply (Gould and Conway-Morris 1999) , the point is not whether or not there are other mechanisms than natural selection, a conundrum that we are unable to solve, but whether there were many more new phyla in the Cambrian, a great part of which effectively disappeared. 39 The contingency thesis relies on an affirmative answer to this question, which should be studied by paleontological and morphological means. So notwithstanding the strong challenge to selectionism, the important consequences for the interpretation of the history of life rely on empirical investigations. But the question is likely to be begged by methodological considerations involving disparity. If diversity means the variety of species, disparity means the heterogeneity of the body plans. Gould contends that whereas diversity may have increased, disparity decreased. But even if we knew what the Cambrian phyla were, this would not entail the ability to measure disparity (Sterelny 1995 . Cladists mostly think that we can trace the genealogy of phyla, but not evaluate the distance or difference between two phyla, because the criteria are always instrumental. In this view, Gould's thesis would not be testable. The basic question, beyond the measure of disparity, is the 38 For example, Hallucigenia, once viewed as a quite unique species in its phyla, if turned upside down could enter into the phylum of the echinoderms (Conway-Morris 1998). 39 An argument against the contingency thesis would be convergence, if similar features appear several times in different lineages, they are more likely to appear even if we change some initial conditions of evolution (Sterelny 1995; Conway-Morris and Gould 1999) . But such an argument makes use of excessively undefined notions of necessity and identity. counting of body plans, hence the definition of body plans. Failing any consensus about that, the contingency thesis, whether or not empirically adequate, is not likely to be tested.
From a distance, the current state of evolutionary theory may in general be characterized as facing two kinds of challenges, weak and strong. Weak challenges imply, if successful, a revision of some part of the theory in order to integrate new methods and concepts; strong challenges entail giving up some major credos of the Modern Synthesis. In the case of Gould's punctuated equilibria and contingency thesis, those two challenges focus on the first Darwinian claim, the form of the Tree of Life. Here, the strong challenge would lead us to give up both gradualism and the hope of finding a general account of the history of life through one explanatory schema.
But the same situation arises in the case of the second Darwinian claim, concerning the process in evolution. Here, challenges are forged by developmentalists. The weak challenge proposed by Evo-Devo involves a rethinking of the conditions and mechanisms of selection when it comes to development and the origin of evolvability. The strong challenge is formulated by DST proponents and entails giving up the concept of gene or its main role in inheritance and selection. 
Preliminary assumptions concerning the view of selection
The controversies addressed here over the limits and scope of natural selection, although not devoid of empirical content, are largely dependent on the conception that the authors have of the nature of selection. So far, I have left aside the most general alternative regarding this conception, an alternative which provides both a negative view and a positive view of selection. In the former option, selection merely selects, hence it just sorts high-fitness traits against low-fitness ones; in the latter option, selection is by itself creative. Mayr (1965b) claims selection is not a ''purely negative force'' since it gradually improves existing traits. Among biologists, this positive view is widely held: Dobzhansky, Simpson, and Gould shared Mayr's view. The general question underlying this split is: what does selection actually explain? It does not explain why this individual has this trait (this is due to 40 Kitcher (in Gray et al. 2001 ) and are moderate appraisals of the extent to which the developmentalist challenge demands revision of the evolutionary theory. Kitcher (2004) is also sympathetic with Gould's weak challenge but defends neo-Darwinism against Gould's strong challenge. developmental effects); as a population-level explanation, it explains precisely why this trait, once it had arisen, pervaded and persisted in a population. Thus, Sober (1984) subscribes to the negative view that selection is a population-level explanation, as we noted, so that the question ''why is trait A in individual B?'' does not belong to what it explains. 41 Neander (1995) challenged this view in a paper expressing the epistemological substance of Mayr's intuition. Apart from the two questions that I have distinguished (the ''developmental question'' and the ''persistence question''), there is the ''creative question,'' which is: why did the genetic and developmental devices underpinning a given trait arise in a population? Contrary to the positive view, Neander contends that natural selection contributes an answer to this creative question. Perhaps speaking of creation is misleading because of the connotations of the word, evoking an instantaneous happening. I give here a slightly modified argument. In fact, even if the genotype conditioning the new trait is not created by selection, selection does increase the probability of the several genes composing this genotype, given that some of its genes have already arisen. The point is that, if a high fitness trait has a genotype G1 . . . G9 (measured in a model of the fitness of possible genotypes), and if G1 spreads into a population, then without hypothesis of selection at all, G2 . . . G9 are not more probable (than other alleles) than before; but under the hypothesis of selection, once G1 is there, the probabilities of G2, . . . G9 being fixed are significantly raised since they are part of the higher fitness genotype G1 . . . G9 and are more likely to appear than the less fit G1G 0 2G 0 3 . . . G 0 9. So selection has causally contributed, 42 not only to the spreading of the genes G1, G2, . . . G9 in the population, but also to the emergence of the integrated genotype G1 . . . G9, namely, the novel trait we are considering.
This defense of the positive view of selection can be extended. Natural selection is a three-stage process, variation, differential reproduction as effect of the variations, and change in gene frequency. But the two first stages are not easy to distinguish, since, although variation is conceived as resulting from mutation and mostly recombination, selection may affect the regime of variations, and therefore, controls the very parameters of its own exercise. It has been shown in some bacteria exposed to stress that selection can enforce the mutation 41 Of course, the issue of explanation is correlated to the question of causation: ''what does selection actually cause?'' More strongly commited than Sober to the Negative view, Walsh (2000) claims that natural selection is not even a cause of adaptations, since strictly speaking their causes have to be found in the developmental life cycles of the individual and forces acting upon it. Selection is merely a sorting process that presupposes such real causes. 42 At least in the probabilistic sense of causation, meaning that a cause increases the probability of its effect.
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rate, providing an advantage in the range of available selective responses to environmental shifts. 43 The notion that mutation rate is somehow controlled by selection, whereas mutations are the material upon which selection acts, demonstrates a kind of reflective impinging of natural selection on its own parameters. Such a reflexive structure of selection allows one to say that the traits selected are themselves dependent on the form of selection pressures, hence that they are somehow shaped, not only sorted, by selection. In the present case, even if the content of mutation is not given by selection and is prior to selection, any individual mutation is still counterfactually dependent on selection since the probability of its occurrence is directly dependent on the mutation rate. In the same spirit, Mayr (1970) suggested years ago that competition itself is under the control of selection (since too much competition could render selection impossible). To this extent, it seems difficult to separate positive causes of the new individual phenotypes emerging (''shaping'') from negative causes affecting their spreading or extinction (''sorting''). So, provided that the causal and explanatory regimes of natural selection are conceived as different from the explanatory regime at the individual developmental level, the positive view of selection is likely to be adopted.
Metaphysical issues about natural selection: some problems with realism
At many times, the issues exposed here involved a general metaphysical question, which is the problem of realism. Under this name philosophers of science try to understand the status of theoretical entities, such as electrons, oxygen, energy, gene, etc.-entities, which are often nonobservable. Roughly speaking, some defend realism, which means that those entities, and the process that involve them, are real things, whereas others are instrumentalists or pragmatists, which means that those terms gain there meaning only in the context of the scientific inquiry, mostly to allow predictions and other tests. The fact that natural selection itself could not achieve the status of general physical laws alerts us that the problem of realism could be different in biology and physics. Rosenberg (1994) convincingly defended the thesis that evolutionary biology, as opposed to physics, must be conceived of instrumentally. One of his chief arguments is the supervenience of every concept bound to natural selection. Since natural selection selects for effects notwithstanding their causes (e.g., it 43 Andersson, Schlechta, Roth (1998); Mc Phee, Ambrose (1996) ; Taddei, Matic, Radman (1995) . selects for function no matter the physical structure realizing it), according to a natural-selectionist's point of view different real processes and entities are treated as the same thing, which implies that this is an instrumental perspective since it abstracts from the differences between those infinitely varied real processes. ''Instrumental'' here means that natural selection is a concept so coarse-grained that it misses the fine-grained distinctions between real processes, albeit still useful for us in making the depictions we are interested in, since the fine-grained knowledge of all those processes and entities is out of our grasp.
The case for instrumentalism arises also in the context of another issue addressed previously, namely the units of selection controversy. Arguing against genic selectionists, some authors (Sober, Brandon, and Gould) accept that processes, even of group selection, can be described at a genic level since in the end evolution is change in gene frequencies-while contesting that this is the description of what actually happens.
44 Thus, they suppose that the selection process is real and not dependent on our cognitive interests, and in this case the question is to specify the exact level of this process. Realism makes the controversy over units of selection more pressing. On the other hand, pure instrumentalism would dissolve it into the methodological question of the best mathematical model for a given process.
Realism in this context means that there is one real process of selection, and we have to decide what identifies this real process. Realism, of course, does not preclude any option regarding the debate itself: one can be a realist genic selectionist, allowing group selection to be an interesting description of phenomena, but one that does not identify the real process. But due to the structure of natural selection, it is not certain whether this sharp distinction between a real process and a convenient description holds. Following a suggestion by Kenneth Waters (1991) , I will stress some consequences of the context-sensitivity principle.
Single genes, considered at a population level, are selected for or against with regard to their context, which means the environment of their phenotypic effects and principally their genetic environment (Mayr 1965b) . Their selective advantages are context-sensitive. But the argument applies, finally, to any presumed unit of selection: its fitness depends on the whole interaction. Even Dawkins (1982) uses it in order to reject the claim that nucleotides in the end could be the real units of selection (their context is the entire allele).
But given that we are considering a population of such entities, contexts (environments for organisms, genetic environments for genes, etc.) are not always likely to be homogenous. Even in the classical case of Kettlewell's industrial melanism, there are places in the woods where trees are mostly white, others where trees are mostly black, and in each of those contexts fitness values of black moths and white moths differ. Then the fitness value of the entity is obtained through averaging the various values across the varied homogenous contexts. Now, if we are tough realists and claim that only causal interactions in nature, such as the selection or deselection of an entity within its given context, are real, those averaged values will be mere convenient placeholders for the real processes. But in this case-and this is the most important point-the argument holds equally against genic selectionism and against organism-level selectionism, since as averaged, all fitness values are such placeholders. So if we do not want to collapse into total instrumentalism, we have to accept that selection processes with averaged fitnesses at many levels are different ways for us to describe the same real process and the unique way to get real information about it. But at all those levels, different forms of information are complementary. 45 Picking out the supposed real processes, each in its single context, is not exactly the job of the evolutionary theorist, but he or she has many ways to describe the same multiplicity of processes. If there is in fact one real process, it nonetheless must be addressed at several descriptive levels. Kenneth Waters calls this a ''tempered realism'' because it tempers the sharp distinction between real theoretical entities involved in single-context selective processes and instrumental concepts.
This case for pluralism has to be distinguished from the multilevel selection advocated by Brandon or (in another way) by Sober and Wilson and from the Sterelny-Kitcher theory. In Brandon's pluralism, there are many possible forms of selection, but there might be cases in which selection plays only at one level. Pluralism is then compatible with tough realism. In contrast, pluralism sustained by tempered realism contends that there are always several levels of description for a same process-context-sensitivity implying that there is no way of discriminating what is the ''real'' process from descriptive reconstitutions of processes. This last assertion contrasts with Sterelny and Kitcher pluralism since these authors claim that the genic level description is ''maximally informative,'' and-unlike other types of selection-is in all cases available. Tempered realist pluralism is not committed to such a genic privilege.
The controversy about units of selection was not expected to be solved by those considerations, which had two interests: to exemplify the fact that epistemological essential debates in evolutionary biology bear important metaphysical consequences and to illustrate the requisite of forging a definition of realism proper to evolutionary theory when we are about to discuss those metaphysical matters. In this perspective, the idea of tempered realism should contain lessons for other entangled debates about the metaphysical and epistemological sides of evolutionary biology. Due in particular to the epistemological status of natural selection, no general assertion from philosophy of science can decide the issue of realism within it and even enunciate what it would mean to be a ''realist'' in this context.
3
An evolutionary framework for philosophical issues?
A philosophical focus on evolutionary theory cannot ignore the huge consequences that Darwinism had for traditional philosophical problems, ranging from theological and moral matters to psychology. Since this field is as wide as philosophy itself, I will not even try a small survey but will instead indicate two or three perspectives on the fecundity and the difficulties involved in the use of evolutionary considerations in philosophical debates on human nature. Evolutionary theory pervades the whole theoretical discourse on man: from philosophy of mind and language to morals through epistemology. 46 Two general motives can be distinguished: applying the power of selectionist schemes to problems outside biology; integrating traditional problems of meaning and culture within a large evolutionary framework, which permits asking anew the question of the origins of some devices (of ethics, of language, etc.), which has been avoided because of the untestability of hypotheses. In a strict sense, only the second strategy can be called a naturalistic evolutionary framework; however, the first one is almost always thought of within a naturalistic strategy.
47 Here I will not consider issues in evolutionary ethics (see Chapter 25, Volume 3).
Selectionist models of culture and science
As we have seen, there exists a general formula of selection that does not specify the replicators and interactors. Thus, provided that we can establish heritability for some cultural or moral entity, a selectionist schema could render its birth and fate intelligible. Culture, and science or epistemology, are the most important 46 The main general philosophical account of the consequences of evolutionary theory outside biology is Dennett (1995) . 47 ''Naturalism''qualifies here any research program that formulates its questions and constitutes its method along the sole lines of natural science methodology, and that does not accept any entity originating and subsisting for itself above the nature studied by those sciences. fields of explananda for those theories. It was noticed long ago that one human characteristic, whether unique or just developed to a unique extreme, is culture; and the fact is that besides genetic inheritance there is cultural heredity: individuals learn, and they can transmit what they have learnt, which appears somehow replicated. So, given that the transmitted items are likely to be slightly modified each time they are reproduced, a selectionist evolutionary account of culture can be worked out. It faces at least two big problems: the first one is the relationship between genetic and cultural inheritance. The fact is that an entity may have great ''cultural'' reproductive success while its bearer leaves no offspring. So there is no necessary genetic basis for cultural traits, although if a cultural trait enhances the fitness of its bearer-think of any medical device that fights illness-then this enhances its own reproductive success. The other problem is the definition of this ''success,'' given that cultural transmission is not only vertical as in heredity, but also horizontal (e.g., toward non offspring), and this dimension is at least as important as the vertical one for the spreading of a trait. Boyd and Richerson (1985) formulated a powerful set of models for cultural evolution. They did not make general assumptions concerning the genetic bases of cultural traits, but clearly cultural evolution, with the vertical and horizontal dimensions of transmission, implicates rather complicated relationships with genetic evolution. One of the main results of the models is that cultural evolution is far faster than genetic evolution. This strengthens, justifies, and explains our intuition that since long ago in human history, biological evolution has been negligible compared to cultural changes.
There is a large methodological issue here: is this selectionist theory of culture analogous to natural selection in biology, or is it a part of this theory? Boyd and Richerson are quite neutral; Dawkins's ''memetic'' sounds like an analogon of evolutionary theory. Other authors (Lumsden and Wilson 1981) are more committed to a ''continuous'' view, which includes a criticizable assertion on the genetic basis of cultural traits. 48 The part of culture which is technique is susceptible to a similar evolutionary approach, and it may be easier since the problem of adaptation has many parallels with technical evolution (Basalla 1988 ). If we consider technique (for example, photographic cameras since their origin), it is even possible to draw an evolutionary tree similar to a branch of the Tree of Life, with extinctions, radiations, privileged lines of evolution, and so forth. And concerning mechanism, we have variation provided by changing fabrication technologies, and we have a kind of 48 A severe critique is to be found in Maynard-Smith (1996) . A general evaluation of the possibilities offered to selectionist theories of culture in a quite sympathetic perspective is given by Kitcher (2003b). process of selection since the more robust or efficient objects are more likely to be copied. Hence, it should be possible to define a property analogous to fitness. It is plausible that this field of the study of culture will be most likely to receive satisfactory evolutionary treatment.
Science is a limited area of culture subject to a specific constraint (namely, its aim to represent the world in some way). The foundationalist program for the philosophy of science, in quest for a priori rules and guarantee for scientific inquiry, declined in the 1960s following extensive critiques and philosophers after Quine turned to a naturalized epistemology, e.g., an epistemology situated at the same empirical level as the sciences, not considering them from an a priori point of view. In so far as they use selection, which presupposes no trend among the selected entities toward any end, evolutionary models of science have the advantage that they do not presuppose any shared rationality or ideal from the scientists and even no special competence to recognize what is true. It is a fact that no definitive formulation of the goal of science, of what is ''objective truth'' and the criteria to recognize it, has ever been enunciated; thus, we cannot presuppose that all actors are oriented toward the same goal. A selectionist process is able to produce theories with the tightest match to the real world, whenever theories bear any consequences in practical life (those consequences will be the effects upon which selection acts) (Ruse 1986) . At the price of giving up the idea that science aims at eternal and ideal truth (Giere 2001) , evolutionary epistemology with a strong selectionist commitment, as originally formulated by Campbell and variously advocated by Giere or Hull (1988) , 49 gives a clear picture of the ''process of science'' that conciliates the lack of empirically attested ''aim'' with the cumulative improvement of the fit between theories, data and applications.
However, the nature of replicators and interactors in this process is a confused issue: contents (and how to define them), scientists, etc.-although the clearest account of this perspective is Hull's. So, one has to prove that truth of theories defines a kind of reproductive advantage, which is not obvious if the entities at issue are human beings. 50 Giere's verdict (1990) is that evolutionary epistemology is for the moment like Darwinism before the synthesis with genetics, hence it lacks a theory of the mechanisms providing heredity and variation 49 Evolutionary epistemology was not born with Campbell; in fact philosophers like Toulmin elaborated a so-called ''evolutionary epistemology''. I consider only recent theories with their massive use of selectionist models. 50 Kenneth Waters (1990) provided a powerful critique of this Darwinian analogy concerning the growth of science, to the extent that it leaves apart intellectual powers of scientists as reflexive agents of selection of fittest contents.
Evolutionary theory in philosophical focus across individuals. However, such an account might be now provided by cognitive sciences.
Like a selectionist theory of culture that is neutral regarding the biological foundations of cultural traits, evolutionary epistemology is not directly committed to any psychological theory of the acquisition of knowledge. There are some evolutionary theories, using selectionist models, that address this point, but this is ''evolutionary epistemology'' in another sense: ''Evolutionary epistemology of mechanisms'' (ETM) distinguished by Bradie (1984) from ''Evolutionary epistemology of theories'' (ETT) of science as a process. They could be complementary (as in Campbell's Selection Theory (1990) ), but they have no logical connection. In general, ETM can nevertheless be understood at an ontogenetical level, or at a phylogenetic level. Now since this last ETM research program belongs to an evolutionary representation of mind within nature, in order to figure out the philosophical issues at stake, here I now turn to the other strategy, which builds a continuous evolutionary framework for solving questions concerning the nature of man.
Evolutionary psychology
When one talks about evolutionism in psychology, one nowadays could mean many programs, but here I will emphasize a very recent and influential one, namely evolutionary psychology.
The general framework of its strategy is the quest for adaptive value of the features of the human mind. Since the Tooby and Cosmides formulation, the guidelines of the program have been: the human mind is made up of separate cognitive modules that quite unconsciously effectuate successful determinate algorithms that have been constituted through natural selection as adaptations during one of the longest periods of hominization, namely the Pleistocene. One of the main hypotheses is the ''cheater detection'' module, supposed to solve the problem of discovering the free-riders in situations of reciprocal altruismsituations that should have been frequent in the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation, and which have been analyzed in evolutionary game theory. Mating behavior and sexual dimorphism 51 are an important subject of this research program, within which a robust explanation was provided of some social cognition modules , of our computationally amazing 51 Papers by Buss and Symons in Barkow et al. (1992) , Sterelny and Fitness (2003) . A powerful methodological and epistemological critique is given in Kitcher (2003b). capacities to recognize faces, or of the origin of our ability to represent what others think (called ''theory of mind'').
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A large part of that research is conducted in linguistics because new theories of the origin of language become available when people question the adaptive significance of communicating through systems of signs (Pinker and Bloom 1992) . Here, the evolutionary framework offers new possibilities in linguistics, among them Chomsky's idea of a generative grammar embedded in innate competencies acquired through phylogenesis, which was incapable of being worked out before one had such a framework.
The major assumptions in evolutionary psychology are that the mind is composed of ''domain-specific'' algorithms, in opposition to the most pervasive cognitivist hypothesis of some generalist algorithms that are embedded in our minds like some kinds of General Problem Solvers. Here, the psychological thesis fits nicely in the evolutionary framework, because if cognitive competences have been modeled as answers to particular environmental problems, they are necessarily domain-specific. Here, evolutionary theory allows authors to account for flaws or irrationalities in our mind highlighted by the work of Tversky and Kahnemann as a lack of adaptation of our cognitive abilities to our present times (since they were adapted in a very different environment) and also for our quite perfect ability to execute tasks generally unnoticed by traditional cognitivist psychology (recognition of faces, for instance). The last consequence is that cultural traits and institutions must be understood from a prior knowledge of psychological cognitive abilities (Cosmides and Tooby 1989) .
Apart from the question of the genic basis of behavior and the commitment of some authors to rather dissatisfying views of genetics (Dupré 2003) , evolutionary psychology faces several difficulties: the lack of informations concerning the original Pleistocene environment (which leads to the rise of just so stories 53 ), and the difficulty of testing the main empirical achievements of the research program since competing hypotheses are in circulation. 54 More generally, the whole program is in need of clarification of what is to be counted as trait, since this decision effects all subsequent empirical investigations. Suppose that we are investigating the evolutionary significance of aggressive behavior: is it the ''right'' 52 Chisholm (2003) . 53 Lewens (2004) gives a critique of the inference from a reconstituted Pleistocene problem to hypothetical cognitive module. 54 Two of the greatests achievements of the program-the Waist-To-Hip ratio theory in the field of mating strategies and the Wason selection task in the field of social cognition-are still severely challenged [Sperber and Girotto (2003) for the second one, with examples of equally corroborated rival theories; Gray et al. (2004) for both of them].
trait to explain? Or is it a part of a general disposition that responds either in a friendly way or aggressively to various situations? Or could it be a too general lumping of various traits: envy, jealousy, territorial ambition, etc.? . Unless this conceptual problem is directly addressed, the whole evolutionary psychology agenda is likely to give birth to diverging, incompatible results with no way to discriminate between them and finally many underlying ideological motives to adopt one or another.
Conclusions
However interpreted, evolutionary theory is filled with theoretical problems concerning its major concepts (selection, fitness, adaptation) and hence its two major claims of the Tree of Life and of the Hypothesis of Selection. Those problems, albeit never empty of empirical and biological content, are at the same time philosophical since they involve conceptual matters that imply epistemological and metaphysical options. Although they cannot be solved independently of the biological results, and above all could not have been formulated without the acknowledged state of evolutionary biology, they are not likely to be solved only within biological science itself. But, reciprocally, their correct enunciation and the attempt at solutions are of vital interest to the fields of philosophy of science in general and of metaphysics. However, the most tangible impinging of evolutionary theory on philosophy is the possibility that it gives to elaborate a new framework for many general problems and first of all about the nature of man. I have tried to show the interest of the research programs constituted in this direction, their variety, and the difficulties they are facing. No integrative and synthetic knowledge of man or methodological framework of philosophical problems has yet been accomplished in such an evolutionary spirit that would be parallel and compatible with (and in the end integrated in) the Modern Synthesis. For the moment, we have local results, new challenges never free of ideological and political commitments, and insightful ways of approaching long-standing puzzles (such as the origin of language, maternal attachment, or technological evolution). But in the end, it must be said that this will have profound consequences on the way we generally conceive of philosophical problems and most of all on the image of man that is concerned with those problems. 
